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EXTENDING POSITIVE IDENTIFICATION FROM PERSONS TO PLACES: 
TERRORISM, ARMED CONFLICT, AND THE IDENTIFICATION OF 
MILITARY OBJECTIVES 
 
Laurie R. Blank* 
 
In January 2013, French forces combating rebel forces in Mali attacked 
“Islamic targets” in northern Mali and French fighter planes “hit rebel targets in 
the northern cities of Gao and Kidal.”1 Turkish forces frequently attack “rebel 
positions,” fighting the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) in Iraq’s Kurdistan 
region, 2 and the Sri Lankan Army targeted “terrorist stronghold[s]” during the 
conflict with the Tamil Tigers.3 The Israel Defense Forces contend with “rocket 
villages” in Hezbollah-dominated areas in southern Lebanon and with the 
complexities of a periodically intensifying conflict with a terrorist entity governing 
the Gaza Strip.4 In Afghanistan, U.S. and multinational forces seek not only to 
target Taliban and al-Qaeda operatives, but also to disable and destroy the 
infrastructure that enables them to continue launching and threatening attacks 
against the Afghan government and multinational forces.5 
Conflicts between States and non-state actors are certainly not a new 
phenomenon, but over the past decade or more, the legal issues they highlight have 
dominated the academic and policy discourse. With regard to targeting, these 
debates have focused almost entirely on who can be targeted—attacked—in the 
course of an armed conflict with a non-state entity, in accordance with the law of 
armed conflict. To be sure, identifying individuals who are legitimate targets in 
* © 2013 Laurie R. Blank. Director, International Humanitarian Law Clinic, Emory 
University School of Law. I am grateful to Tariq Mohideen for his excellent research 
assistance in preparation of this Article. 
1 George Thomas, French Military Pounds Islamic Targets in Mali, CBN NEWS (Jan. 
18, 2013), http://www.cbn.com/cbnnews/world/2013/January/French-Military-Pounds-
Islamist-Targets-in-Mali. 
2  Turkey Defends Incursions in Iraq, BBC NEWS (Dec. 19, 2007, 12:23 AM), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7151074.stm. 
3 Sri Lankan Military Targets LTTE in North, UPI.COM (Oct. 13, 2008, 2:00 PM), 
http://www.upi.com/Emerging_Threats/2008/10/13/Sri-Lankan-military-targets-LTTE-in-
north/UPI-47791223920808. 
4 Israeli Map Shows Nearly 1,000 Hezbollah Sites, AL ARABIYA NEWS (Mar. 31, 
2011, 2:48 PM), http://www.alarabiya.net/articles/2011/03/31/143666.html. 
5 See George Friedman, Strategic Divergence: The War Against the Taliban and the 
War Against Al Qaeda, STRATFOR GLOBAL INTELLIGENCE (Jan. 26, 2009, 1:01 PM), http://
www.stratfor.com/weekly/20090126_strategic_divergence_war_against_taliban_and_war_
against_al_qaeda; Henry Kissinger, A Strategy for Afghanistan, WASH. POST (Feb. 26, 
2009), http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2009-02-26/opinions/36927848_1_afghan-pakist
ani-afghan-population-military-strategy; NATO Pursues New Strategy for Afghan 
Insurgency, VOICE OF AM. (Feb. 10, 2010, 7:00 PM), http://www.voanews.com/content/ 
nato-pursues-new-strategy-for-countering-afghan-insurgency-84179592/165352.html. 
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non-international armed conflict is challenging, made particularly so by the 
common practice of non-state actors purposely mingling with the civilian 
population. 6 The erosion of the distinction between fighter and civilian during 
armed conflict, most notably in conflicts with organized armed groups, terrorist 
groups, and other non-state entities, is a primary cause for the continued and 
increased danger for civilians during wartime, and also lies at the heart of many 
challenging implementation issues for state armed forces.7 The current debate over 
the United States’ program of targeted strikes by armed drones centers on precisely 
this question, for example: Who can be targeted in the course of a conflict with a 
transnational non-state entity, and how should such persons be identified?8 
These issues and questions continue to be of great importance. However, 
military operations in armed conflict are not limited simply to actions taken against 
individuals and groups or units of persons fighting. All manner of objects—
buildings, equipment, roadways, bridges, communications networks, airfields, 
strategic locations, and more—are also vital components of military operations and 
can be legitimate targets of attack during conflict. Unlike in the area of 
categorization of persons, where the difference between international armed 
conflict and non-international armed conflict is significant in providing for 
combatant status and prisoner of war protections in the former category of conflict 
only, the law makes no distinction between the two types of conflict in addressing 
the types of objects that can be attacked or must be protected.9 Nonetheless, the 
nature of conflicts with non-state actors—which encompasses more than one type 
of non-international armed conflict—introduces a number of issues specific to 
targeting of objects in such conflicts. 
This Article addresses the identification of military objectives in a variety of 
non-international armed conflict contexts, including conflicts with terrorist groups 
operating transnationally and conflicts with non-state actors located outside the 
State’s borders. In particular, the nature of non-international armed conflict can 
6 Ann Scott Tyson, In Afghanistan, A Test of Tactics, WASH. POST, Aug. 13, 2009, at 
A6, available at http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2009-08-13/world/36785580_1_helm 
and-river-anibal-paz-taliban-fighters. 
7 See, e.g., Laurie R. Blank, Taking Distinction to the Next Level: Accountability for 
Fighters’ Failure to Distinguish Themselves from Civilians, 46 VAL. U. L. REV. 765 (2012) 
(discussing how the failure of fighters to distinguish themselves from innocent civilians 
undermines the law’s protection of innocent civilians). 
8  See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, LAWFULNESS OF A LETHAL OPERATION DIRECTED 
AGAINST A U.S. CITIZEN WHO IS A SENIOR OPERATIONAL LEADER OF AL-QA’IDA OR AN 
ASSOCIATED FORCE (2013), available at http://msnbcmedia.msn.com/i/msnbc/sections/ 
news/020413_DOJ_White_Paper.pdf; Michael Isikoff, Justice Department Memo Reveals 
Legal Case for Drone Strikes on Americans, NBCNEWS.COM (Feb. 4, 2013, 8:57 PM), 
http://openchannel.nbcnews.com/_news/2013/02/04/16843014-justice-department-memo-r 
eveals-legal-case-for-drone-strikes-on-americans?lite. 
9  1 JEAN-MARIE HENCKAERTS & LOUISE DOSWALD-BECK, CUSTOMARY 
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 29–32 (2005) (noting that the definition of military 
objectives is applicable as customary international law in both international and non-
international armed conflicts). 
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alter how the basic definition and analysis of the term “military objective” is 
applied. For example, the same types of objects that would automatically be 
considered military in nature in an international armed conflict—a conflict 
between two States—would not necessarily suggest the same military connotation 
in a non-international armed conflict. Another comprehensive analytical challenge 
lies in the fact that nearly every object in a non-international armed conflict will 
fall into the category of dual-use objects; very few will be objectively and solely 
military and, unfortunately, all too often very few objects will retain a solely 
civilian use. 
Operationally, state armed forces fighting against a non-state actor, whether 
an insurgent group inside its borders, a non-state entity in a neighboring State, or a 
transnational terrorist group, need to make the same determinations about lawful 
targets as in any other conflict, international or non-international. In this sense, the 
fact that those state forces are combating a non-state actor does not change either 
the definition of military objective or the practical, operational task of identifying 
lawful objectives and applying targeting doctrine and the law of armed conflict to 
that process to ensure lawful military operations in all circumstances. However, the 
challenges of conflicts with non-state actors introduce a range of questions 
regarding how the definitional components of military objective should be 
understood and applied. With regard to two of the core purposes of the law of 
armed conflict, exploring and understanding the import of these questions and how 
they play out in practice is essential. First, protection of civilians: distinguishing 
between military and civilian objects is perhaps the fundamental aspect of how the 
law of armed conflict regulates the conduct of hostilities so as to minimize civilian 
suffering and harm during war.10 Second, enabling effective military operations: 
the law of armed conflict is not designed to prevent war, nor was it envisioned as a 
set of constraints that would make it impractical to engage in combat, thereby 
leaving States with no effective options to fulfill their core mission of protecting 
national security and their own citizens from danger.11 Rather, the law is inherently 
practical; it is meant to facilitate the lawful and effective fulfillment of military 
operations. To the extent that the application of the definition of military objectives 
in non-international armed conflicts introduces complications and conceptual 
challenges that blur the lines between civilian and military, and exacerbate existing 
difficulties, it is important to tease out and better understand those conceptual 
challenges. 
Part I of this Article sets forth the framework for targeting within the law of 
armed conflict, including the key principles of the law that govern targeting, both 
the choice of target and the means and methods used to apply combat force to that 
target. In addition, Part I highlights the basic challenges of positive identification 
10 CLAUDE PILLOUD ET AL., INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, COMMENTARY ON THE 
ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 1977 TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 
1949, at 630 (Yves Sandoz et al., 1987). 
11 See LAURIE R. BLANK & GREGORY P. NOONE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ARMED 
CONFLICT: FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES AND CONTEMPORARY CHALLENGES IN THE LAW OF 
WAR 10–11 (2013). 
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that are particularly relevant in, although not limited to, non-international armed 
conflict. Part II analyzes the definition of military objective, including the 
historical background to the concept of military objective and how the existing 
definition has developed and applies in current conflicts. Finally, Part III analyzes 
in depth how conflicts with non-state actors pose difficulties for the application of 
the definition of military objective to potential targets, in effect extending the 
ongoing conversation regarding positive identification of persons to the 
identification of objects as well. In particular, Part III addresses the question of 
which objects are inherently military in nature in such conflicts, whether dual-use 
extends to nearly all objects because of the nature of how non-state armed groups 
function within the civilian population, and how use and purpose may need to be 
reconceptualized in light of how non-state armed groups operate. Throughout, the 
analysis also identifies areas for further analysis and potential future concerns with 
regard to interpretation and application of the law of armed conflict. 
 
I.  FOUNDATIONS: TARGETING AND THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 
 
The law of armed conflict (LOAC), otherwise known as international 
humanitarian law (IHL) or the law of war, governs the conduct of both States and 
individuals during armed conflict and seeks to minimize suffering in war by 
protecting persons not participating in hostilities and by restricting the means and 
methods of warfare.12 LOAC applies during all situations of armed conflict, with 
the full panoply of the Geneva Conventions and customary law applicable in 
international armed conflict and a more limited body of treaty-based and 
customary law applicable during non-international armed conflict. The 1949 
Geneva Conventions endeavor to address all instances of armed conflict13 and set 
12 See War and International Humanitarian Law, INT’L COMM. RED CROSS (Oct. 29, 
2010), http://www.icrc.org/eng/war-and-law/overview-war-and-law.htm. The law of armed 
conflict is set forth primarily in the four Geneva Conventions of August 14, 1949 and their 
Additional Protocols. See Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 
1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol 
I), opened for signature Dec. 12, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Additional Protocol 
I]; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the 
Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), opened for 
signature Dec. 10, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609 [hereinafter Additional Protocol II]; Geneva 
Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed 
Forces in the Field, opened for signature Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31; 
Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and 
Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, opened for signature Aug. 12, 1949, 6 
U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of 
War, opened for signature Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter 
Geneva Convention III]; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons 
in Time of War, opened for signature Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S 287 
[hereinafter Geneva Convention IV]. 
13 OSCAR M. UHLER ET AL., INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, COMMENTARY: IV 
GENEVA CONVENTION RELATIVE TO THE PROTECTION OF CIVILIAN PERSONS IN TIME OF 
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forth two primary categories of armed conflict that trigger the application of 
LOAC: international armed conflict and non-international armed conflict. 
Common Article 2 of the Geneva Conventions of August 1949 states that the 
Conventions “shall apply to all cases of declared war or of any other armed 
conflict which may arise between two or more of the High Contracting Parties, 
even if the state of war is not recognized by one of them.”14 Common Article 3 of 
the Geneva Conventions of August 1949 sets forth minimum provisions applicable 
“in the case of armed conflict not of an international character occurring in the 
territory of one of the High Contracting Parties.”15 
Just as the existence of an armed conflict triggers the application of LOAC to 
govern the status of persons and the rights and obligations of parties to the conflict, 
the nature of the conflict—whether international or non-international—determines 
the extent of the applicable law. International armed conflicts are subject to the full 
panoply of the Geneva Conventions and the customary laws of war. 16  Non-
international armed conflicts are subject to the more limited legal regime of 
Common Article 3 and the steadily growing customary international law applicable 
in non-international armed conflict, including the principles of military necessity, 
humanity, distinction, and proportionality.17 Over the past several decades, the law 
WAR 26 (Jean S. Pictet ed., Ronald Griffin & C.W. Dumbleton trans., 1958) (“Born on the 
battlefield, the Red Cross called into being the First Geneva Convention to protect 
wounded and sick military personnel. Extending its solicitude little by little to other 
categories of war victims, in logical application of its fundamental principle, it pointed the 
way, first to the revision of the original Convention, and then to the extension of legal 
protection in turn to prisoners of war and civilians. The same logical process could not fail 
to lead to the idea of applying the principle to all cases of armed conflict, including internal 
ones.”). 
14 Geneva Convention III, supra note 12, art. 2; Geneva Convention IV, supra note 
12, art. 2. 
15 Geneva Convention III, supra note 12, art. 3; Geneva Convention IV, supra note 
12, art. 3. 
16 See supra text accompanying note 14; Geoffrey S. Corn, What Law Applies to the 
War on Terror?, in THE WAR ON TERROR AND THE LAWS OF WAR: A MILITARY 
PERSPECTIVE 1, 15 (Michael W. Lewis ed., 2009). 
17  Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Decision on Defence Motion for 
Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, ¶¶ 100–27 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former 
Yugoslavia Oct 2, 1995) (highlighting the development and applicability of necessity, 
distinction, humanity, and proportionality to internal armed conflict); LINDSAY MOIR, THE 
LAW OF INTERNAL ARMED CONFLICT 133–34 (2002); Geoffrey S. Corn & Eric Talbot 
Jensen, Untying the Gordian Knot: A Proposal for Determining Applicability of the Laws 
of War to the War on Terror, 81 TEMP. L. REV. 788, 827 (2008); Christopher Greenwood, 
International Humanitarian Law and the Tadic Case, 7 EUR. J. INT’L L. 265, 275–78 
(1996); see Abella v. Argentina, Case 11.137, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 55/97, 
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.95, doc. 6 rev. ¶¶ 176–77 (1997); Ian G. Corey, The Fine Line Between 
Policy and Custom: Prosecutor v. Tadic and the Customary International Law of Internal 
Armed Conflict, 166 MIL. L. REV. 145, 152–53 (2000); Anthony Cullen, Key Developments 
Affecting the Scope of Internal Armed Conflict in International Humanitarian Law, 183 
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applicable in international armed conflict and that applicable in non-international 
armed conflict has continued to merge, until in many aspects of the law, the legal 
obligations and principles are nearly identical.18 One area where sharp distinctions 
remain is the status of persons: unlike international armed conflict, where LOAC 
recognizes the particular status of combatant, in non-international armed conflict, 
LOAC does not create status categories at all.19 However, for the purposes of this 
Article, which focuses on targeting and, in particular, the identification of military 
objectives, the law applicable in both international and non-international armed 
conflicts is based on the same central principles and obligations. 
 
A.  Key Principles of Targeting 
 
The lawfulness of targeting individuals and objects during armed conflict is 
determined by the principles of distinction, proportionality, and precautions. As a 
foundation for the discussion to follow, this section offers a brief background on 
these key components of the law of targeting. 
One of the most fundamental issues during conflict is identifying who or what 
can be targeted. The principle of distinction, one of the “cardinal principles” of the 
LOAC,20 requires that any party to a conflict distinguish between those who are 
fighting and those who are not and to direct attacks solely at the former. Similarly, 
parties must distinguish between civilian objects and military objects and target 
only the latter. Article 48 of Additional Protocol I thus sets forth the basic rule: “In 
order to ensure respect for and protection of the civilian population and civilian 
objects, the Parties to the conflict shall at all times distinguish between the civilian 
population and combatants and between civilian objects and military objectives 
and accordingly shall direct their operations only against military objectives.”21 
Distinction lies at the core of the LOAC’s seminal goal of protecting innocent 
civilians and persons who are hors de combat. The obligation to distinguish is part 
of the customary international law of both international and non-international 
armed conflicts, as the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia 
(“ICTY”) held in the Tadić case. 22  The purpose of distinction—to protect 
MIL. L. REV. 65, 66 (2005); William A. Schabas, Punishment of Non-State Actors in Non-
International Armed Conflict, 26 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 907, 915–17 (2003). 
18 Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-T, ¶¶ 96–127; EVE LA HAYE, WAR CRIMES IN INTERNAL 
CONFLICTS 380 (2010) (discussing the overlap between the laws of war applicable in 
internal and international armed conflict). 
19  Michael N. Schmitt, The Status of Opposition Fighters in a Non-International 
Armed Conflict, 88 INT’L LAW STUD. 119, 119–20 (2012). 
20 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 
226, ¶ 78 (July 8) (declaring that distinction and the prohibition on unnecessary suffering 
are the two cardinal principles of international humanitarian law). 
21 Additional Protocol I, supra note 12, art. 48. Article 48 is considered customary 
international law. See 1 HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK, supra note 9, at 3–8. 
22 Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-T, ¶ 111 (“Bearing in mind the need for measures to 
ensure the better protection of human rights in armed conflicts of all types, [. . . the General 
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civilians—is emphasized in Article 51 of Additional Protocol I, which states that 
“[t]he civilian population as such, as well as individual civilians, shall not be the 
object of attack.”23 Furthermore, Article 85 of Additional Protocol I declares that 
nearly all violations of distinction constitute grave breaches of the Protocol,24 and 
the Rome Statute similarly criminalizes attacks on civilians and indiscriminate 
attacks.25 
Distinction thus requires identification of lawful targets as a prerequisite to 
the use of force in armed conflict. A lawful attack must be directed at a legitimate 
target: either a combatant, a member of an organized armed group, a civilian 
directly participating in hostilities, or a military objective. In international armed 
conflicts—those occurring between States—all members of the State’s regular 
armed forces are combatants and can be identified by the uniform they wear, 
among other characteristics. Other persons falling within the category of 
combatant include members of volunteer militia who meet four requirements: 
operating under responsible command, wearing a distinctive emblem, carrying 
arms openly, and abiding by the law of armed conflict.26 Members of the regular 
armed forces of a government not recognized by the opposing party and civilians 
participating in a levée en masse also qualify as combatants in international armed 
conflict.27 Combatants can be attacked at all times and enjoy no immunity from 
attack, except when they are hors de combat due to sickness, wounds, or capture. 
In non-international armed conflicts, including State versus non-state actor 
conflicts, there is no combatant status, but individuals who are members of an 
organized armed group are legitimate targets of attack at all times.28 The principle 
Assembly] Affirms the following basic principles for the protection of civilian populations 
in armed conflicts, without prejudice to their future elaboration within the framework of 
progressive development of the international law of armed conflict: . . . [i]n the conduct of 
military operations during armed conflicts, a distinction must be made at all times between 
persons actively taking part in the hostilities and civilian populations.” (first alteration in 
original) (quoting G.A. Res. 2675 (XXV), U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28, U.N. 
Doc. A/8028 (Dec. 9, 1970) (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Legality of the 
Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 1996 I.C.J. 226, ¶ 79 (stating that distinction is one of 
the “intransgressible principles of international customary law”); Abella, Report No. 55/97 
at ¶¶ 177–78 (“[C]ustomary law principles applicable to all armed conflicts require the 
contending parties to refrain from directly attacking the civilian population and individual 
civilians and to distinguish in their targeting between civilians and combatants and other 
lawful military objectives.”); 1 HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK, supra note 9, at 3–8 
(discussing the distinction between civilians and combatants). 
23 Additional Protocol I, supra note 12, art. 51(2). 
24 Id. art. 85(3). 
25 See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 8, para. 2(b)(i)–(ii), (iv)–
(vi), (e)(i)–(ii), (iv), opened for signature July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 3. 
26 Geneva Convention III, supra note 12, art. 4(A)(2). 
27 Id. art. 4(A)(3), (6). 
28 See JIMMY GURULÉ & GEOFFREY S. CORN, PRINCIPLES OF COUNTER-TERRORISM 
LAW 70–76 (2011) (discussing the rules governing targeting of enemy forces in 
international and non-international armed conflict and noting that (1) “a member of an 
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of distinction and concomitant obligations apply with equal force to attacks on 
objects rather than persons; indeed, the obligation to target only military objectives 
lies at the heart of this Article’s analysis of how the identification of military 
objectives is affected by the nature of conflict with non-state actors. 
The second key principle, the principle of proportionality, requires that parties 
refrain from attacks in which the expected civilian casualties will be excessive in 
relation to the anticipated military advantage gained. 29  This principle balances 
military necessity and humanity, and is based on the confluence of two key ideas. 
First, the means and methods of attacking the enemy are not unlimited. Rather, the 
only legitimate object of war is to weaken the military forces of the enemy.30 
Second, the legal proscription on targeting civilians does not extend to a complete 
prohibition on all civilian deaths. The law has always tolerated “[t]he incidence of 
some civilian casualties . . . as a consequence of military action,”31 although “even 
a legitimate target may not be attacked if the collateral civilian casualties would be 
disproportionate to the specific military gain from the attack.”32 That is, the law 
requires that military commanders and decision makers assess the advantage to be 
gained from an attack in light of the likely civilian casualties.33 
Additional Protocol I contains three separate statements of the principle of 
proportionality. The first appears in Article 51, which sets forth the basic 
parameters of the obligation to protect civilians and the civilian population, and 
prohibits any “attack which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian 
life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which 
would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage 
anticipated.”34 This language demonstrates that Additional Protocol I contemplates 
enemy force . . . is presumed hostile and therefore presumptively subject to attack” in 
international armed conflict and (2) “[s]ubjecting members of organized belligerent groups 
to status based targeting pursuant to the LOAC as opposed to civilians who periodically 
lose their protection from attack seems both logical and consistent with the practice of 
[S]tates engaged in non-international armed conflicts”); INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, 
INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE ON THE NOTION OF DIRECT PARTICIPATION IN HOSTILITIES 27–29 
(2009) (stating that organized armed groups are targetable based on status in non-
international armed conflict). 
29 Additional Protocol I, supra note 12, art. 51(5)(b). 
30 Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and Its 
Annex: Regulations Concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, art 22, Oct. 18, 
1907. 
31 Judith Gardam, Necessity and Proportionality in Jus Ad Bellum and Jus In Bello, 
in INTERNATIONAL LAW, THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS 
275, 283–84 (Laurence Boisson de Chazournes & Philippe Sands eds., 1999). 
32 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 
226, 587 (July 8) (dissenting opinion of Judge Higgins). 
33 The term “collateral damage” is often used in the media and by the public to refer 
to the incidental (meaning not deliberate) civilian casualties from an attack on a military 
target. 
34 Additional Protocol I, supra note 12, art. 51(5)(b). 
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incidental civilian casualties, and appears again in Articles 57(2)(a)(iii) 35  and 
57(2)(b),36 which refer specifically to precautions in attack. Proportionality is not a 
mathematical concept, but rather a guideline to help ensure that military 
commanders weigh the consequences of a particular attack and refrain from 
launching attacks that will cause excessive civilian deaths. The principle of 
proportionality is well accepted as an element of customary international law 
applicable in all armed conflicts.37 
Lastly, LOAC mandates that all parties take certain precautionary measures to 
protect civilians. In many ways, the identification of military objectives and the 
proportionality considerations are, of course, precautions. But the obligations of 
the parties to a conflict to take precautionary measures go beyond that. Beginning 
at the broadest level, Article 57(1) of Additional Protocol I states, “In the conduct 
of military operations, constant care shall be taken to spare the civilian population, 
civilians and civilian objects.” 38  This provision is a direct outgrowth of and 
supplement to the Basic Rule in Article 48, which mandates that all parties 
distinguish between combatants and civilians and between military objects and 
civilian objects.39 The practical provisions forming the major portion of Article 57 
discuss precautions to be taken specifically when launching an attack. Precautions 
are, understandably, a critical component of the law’s efforts to protect civilians 
and are of particular importance in densely populated areas or areas where civilians 
are at risk from the consequences of military operations. For this reason, even if a 
target is legitimate under the laws of war, failure to take precautions can make an 
attack on that target unlawful. 
First, parties must do everything feasible to ensure that targets are military 
objectives. 40 Doing so helps to protect civilians by limiting attacks to military 
targets, thus directly implementing the principle of distinction. Second, they must 
choose the means and methods of attack with the aim of minimizing incidental 
35 Id. art. 57(2)(a)(iii) (“With respect to attacks, the following precautions shall be 
taken: [t]hose who plan or decide upon an attack shall . . . [r]efrain from deciding to launch 
any attack which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to 
civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in 
relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.”). 
36 Id. art. 57(2)(b) (“An attack shall be cancelled or suspended if it becomes apparent 
that the objective is not a military one or is subject to special protection or that the attack 
may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to 
civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the 
concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.”). 
37 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 1996 I.C.J. at 587 (dissenting 
opinion of Judge Higgins); YORAM DINSTEIN, THE CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES UNDER THE 
LAW OF INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT 120 (2004); 1 HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-
BECK, supra note 9, at 46; Michael N. Schmitt, Fault Lines in the Law of Attack, in 
TESTING THE BOUNDARIES OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 277, 292 (Susan 
Breau & Agnieszka Jachec-Neale eds., 2006). 
38 Additional Protocol I, supra note 12, art. 57(1). 
39 Id. art. 48. 
40 Id. art. 57(2)(a)(i). 
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civilian losses and damage.41 For example, during the 1991 Persian Gulf War, 
“pilots were advised to attack bridges in urban areas along a longitudinal axis. This 
measure was taken so that bombs that missed their targets—because they were 
dropped either too early or too late—would hopefully fall in the river and not on 
civilian housing.”42 Another common method of taking precautions is to launch 
attacks on particular targets at night when the civilian population is not on the 
streets or at work, thus minimizing potential losses.43 In addition, when choosing 
between two possible attacks offering similar military advantage, parties must 
choose the objective that offers the least likely harm to civilians and civilian 
objects.44 Each of these steps requires an attacking party to take affirmative action 
to preserve civilian immunity and minimize civilian casualties and damage—in 
effect, to take “constant care.”45 Proportionality considerations are also a major 
component of the precautions framework. Parties are required to refrain from any 
attacks that would be disproportionate and to cancel any attacks where it becomes 
evident that the civilian losses would be excessive in light of the military 
advantage.46 Finally, Article 57(2)(c) of Additional Protocol I requires attacking 
parties to issue an effective advance warning of “attacks which may affect the 
civilian population, unless circumstances do not permit.”47 
These key principles of LOAC form the essential guideposts for targeting in 
armed conflict, whether against persons or objects. With regard to the targeting of 
objects, only objects that meet the definition of military objective constitute 
legitimate targets of attack, as required by the principle of distinction; once such 
determination is made, the obligations introduced by the principles of 
proportionality and precautions must be fulfilled as well. The obligation to target 
only military objectives is one way of implementing the age-old principle that the 
means and methods of warfare are not unlimited.48 Part II below sets forth the 
41 Id. art. 57(2)(a)(ii). 
42 Jean-François Quéguiner, Precautions Under the Law Governing the Conduct of 
Hostilities, 88 INT’L REV. RED CROSS, 793, 801 (2006). This angle of attack “also means 
that damage would tend to be in the middle of the bridge and thus easier to repair.” Id. at 
801 n.27. 
43 See id. at 800 (noting that U.S. forces in Iraq conducted offensive operations at 
night in an effort to minimize civilian casualties). 
44 Additional Protocol I, supra note 12, art. 57(3). 
45 Id. art. 57(1). 
46 Id. art. 57(2)(a)(iii), (b). 
47 Id. art. 57(2)(c). 
48 The modern version of this principle appears in Article 35 of Additional Protocol I; 
earlier formulations appear in the writings of Vitoria, Grotius and Vattel, as well as in early 
codifications of the laws of war. See generally The Laws of War on Land art. 4, Sept. 9, 
1880, reprinted in THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICTS 29 (Dietrich Schindler & Jiri Toman 
eds., 4th rev. & completed ed. 2004); Declaration Renouncing the Use in Time of War of 
Explosive Projectiles Under 400 Grammes Weight, Dec. 11, 1868, 138 Consol. T.S. 297; 3 
HUGO GROTIUS, THE LAW OF WAR AND PEACE (George Grafton Wilson ed., Francis W. 
Kelsey trans., Oceana Publ’ns 1964) (1646); EMMERICH DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS 
OR THE PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL LAW APPLIED TO THE CONDUCT AND AFFAIRS OF NATIONS 
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definition of military objective and the parameters for implementing the decision 
during military operations. 
 
B.  Challenges of Positive Identification in Non-International Armed Conflicts 
 
Thousands of pages have been written over the past decade and more about 
the complexities of contemporary conflicts, where the lack of boundaries between 
conflict areas and civilian areas—between those actively participating in hostilities 
and those who are not—pose particular challenges for distinction. Without going 
into great detail or addressing the complexities of this issue, this sub-section 
simply offers a brief glimpse at how these complex conflicts, where the lines 
between innocent civilian and fighter are barely distinguishable, impact the 
obligation of distinction and the need to ensure positive identification of targets. 
These situations demand ever-greater efforts—through intelligence-gathering and 
surveillance—to determine who is whom, and what is what, in the zone of combat 
operations. In addition, modern warfare is increasingly characterized by 
asymmetry in the military capabilities of the parties, which adds to these 
difficulties. As such asymmetry grows, the “disadvantaged party has an incentive 
to blur the distinction between its forces and the civilian population in the hope 
that this will deter the other side from attack.”49 
When hostile persons (members of armed groups or civilians directly 
participating in hostilities, for example) fail to wear uniforms or carry their arms 
openly, differentiating between legitimate targets and innocent civilians is 
extraordinarily difficult and fraught with danger for both the soldier and the 
innocent civilian. Insurgents take advantage of this dilemma every day to gain an 
edge over the superior military capabilities and resources of state forces. During 
Operation Iraqi Freedom, for example, Iraqi insurgents commonly wore civilian 
clothing when approaching American and British forces in order to get closer 
without seeming to present a threat.50 Perhaps most nefariously, insurgent groups 
that employ suicide bombing as a tactic have now turned to the use of women and 
children, for they have proven more likely to evade measures designed to identify 
AND SOVEREIGNS (Neill H. Alford, Jr. ed., Charles G. Fenwick trans., Carnegie Inst. of 
Wash. 1916) (1758); FRANCIS LIEBER, INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF ARMIES 
OF THE UNITED STATES IN THE FIELD art. 16 (Wash., Gov’t Printing Office 1898) 
[hereinafter THE LIEBER CODE], reprinted in THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICTS, supra, at 3; 
FRANCISCUS DE VICTORIA, DE INDIS ET DE IVRE BELLI RELECTIONES (Ernest Nys ed., John 
Pawley Bate trans., Ocean Publ’ns 1964) (1557). 
49 Michael N. Schmitt, The Impact of High and Low-Tech Warfare on the Principle of 
Distinction, in INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW AND THE 21ST CENTURY’S 
CONFLICTS: CHANGES AND CHALLENGES 169, 178 (Roberta Arnold & Pierre-Antoine 
Hildbrand eds., 2005); see also id. at 170 (recognizing a “widening divide between States 
that posses [sic] high-tech military capabilities and those that do not”). 
50 Id.; see also Official: Afghan Militants Fled Dressed as Women, CNN.COM (July 6, 
2009, 4:30 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/asiapcf/07/06/afghanistan.marine.stan
doff/index.html. 
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suicide bombers.51 In Sri Lanka, the Tamil Tigers purposely blended in with the 
civilian population, sought shelter in the safe zones established to provide fire-free 
areas for civilian protection, and used civilians as human shields in the face of 
extensive government shelling.52 There is, unfortunately, no end to the examples 
available of fighters using the cover of the civilian population (as a shield, as a 
disguise, or in other ways) to gain an advantage over the other side. 
These challenges are not limited to the identification of enemy persons, 
however, but extend to the identification of buildings and other objects that are part 
of or contribute to enemy operations. Thus, in conflicts between Israel and Hamas, 
for example, Hamas has used hospitals, schools, mosques, residential houses, and 
other civilian objects extensively for the storage of weapons, firing of rockets, and 
other military purposes.53 In fact, Hamas does not have a “war ministry” or many 
other identifiable military locations—because it deliberately commingles military 
and civilian buildings and objects. Conflicts in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Lebanon, 
among others, also involved similar use of protected objects by insurgents and 
other fighters. 54  Human rights organizations regularly condemned the Iraqi 
51  See, e.g., Dan Abrams, Turning a Blind Eye to Child Suicide Bombers, 
NBCNEWS.COM (March 26, 2004, 11:37:21 AM), http://www.nbcnews.com/id/4601244#.
UWHSZaLYc9U (discussing several incidences of child suicide bombings); Child 
Bombers-in-Training Arrested in Iraq, UPI.COM (April 21, 2009, 11:14 AM), http://www.u
pi.com/Top_News/2009/04/21/Child-bombers-in-training-arrested-in-Iraq/UPI-487612403
26883 (discussing the arrest in Iraq of four children being trained to engage in suicide 
bombings); Cassandra Clifford, The Battle for Child Suicide Bombers, FOREIGN POL’Y 
BLOGS NETWORK (Aug. 4, 2009), http://foreignpolicyblogs.com/2009/08/04/the-battle-for-
child-suicide-bombers (explaining that children are used as suicide bombers because “they 
are easy to manipulate and influence, [and] children are still seen as the least likely suspect 
and thus less likely to be arrested, making them more effective than their adult 
counterparts”); Nic Robertson, Pakistan: Taliban Buying Children for Suicide Attacks, 
CNN.COM (July 7, 2009, 5:36 AM), http://edition.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/asiapcf/07/07/pa
kistan.child.bombers/index.html (explaining that “young suicide bombers may be able to 
reach targets unnoticed”). 
52  Sri Lanka: UN Says Army Shelling Killed Civilians, BBC (Apr. 26, 2011), 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-13190576. 
53 See ANTHONY H. CORDESMAN, CTR. FOR STRATEGIC & INT’L STUDIES, THE “GAZA 
WAR”: A STRATEGIC ANALYSIS 43–47, 49, 51–52, 54–55 (2009), available at http://csis.or 
g/files/media/csis/pubs/090202_gaza_war.pdf (describing how Hamas uses mosques, 
houses and cemeteries for military operations and to store weapons). 
54 See U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations, Letter dated Mar. 5, 
1991 from the Permanent Representative addressed to the President of the Security Council, 
U.N. Doc. S/22341 (Mar. 8, 1991) (explaining that the Iraqis “moved significant amounts 
of military weapons and equipment into civilian areas with the deliberate purpose of using 
innocent civilians and their homes as shields against attacks on legitimate military targets” 
and “Iraqi fighter and bomber aircraft were dispersed into villages near military airfields 
where they were parked between civilian houses and even placed immediately adjacent to 
important archaeological sites and historic treasures”); DEP’T OF DEF., FINAL REPORT TO 
CONGRESS: CONDUCT OF THE PERSIAN GULF WAR 82 (1992) [hereinafter GULF WAR FINAL 
REPORT], available at http://www.ndu.edu/library/epubs/cpgw.pdf (describing the way in 
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practice of using hospitals and mosques for military purposes during Operation 
Iraqi Freedom, as one example. Emphasizing that such use was illegal under 
LOAC, Human Rights Watch’s report Off Target explains that the “protection 
ceases [when] medical establishments are used to commit ‘acts harmful to the 
enemy.’ By using hospitals as military headquarters, Iraqi forces turned them into 
military objectives.”55 During recent armed strife in Thailand, both sides regularly 
used schools as headquarters or barracks for soldiers or militants and also located 
military objectives in schools.56 
All of these examples highlight the need for a thorough and nuanced 
understanding of the definition of military objective, the obligations LOAC places 
on parties to identify military objectives before launching attacks, and how these 
definitions and obligations play out in conflicts with non-state actors. Before 
addressing the particular questions and issues that arise with regard to the 
identification of military objectives in non-international armed conflict, the 
following section sets forth the definition of military objective and the key issues 
inherent in the application of the definition during military operations. 
 
II.  DEFINITION OF MILITARY OBJECTIVE 
 
The principle of distinction obligates parties to a conflict not only to 
differentiate between civilians and combatants, but also between civilian objects 
and military objects as well.57 Separating civilian and military objects forms a 
critical component of the protection of the civilian population during armed 
conflict. The earliest mention of the term “military objective” appears in the 1923 
Hague Rules of Air Warfare, a set of rules drafted by a Commission of Jurists 
established by the Washington Conference of 1922 on the Limitation of 
Armaments. Article 24(1) of the 1923 Hague Rules states, “Aerial bombardment is 
legitimate only when directed at a military objective, that is to say, an object of 
which the destruction or injury would constitute a distinct military advantage to the 
which the Iraqis dispersed aircraft into civilian areas to prevent the destruction of the Iraqi 
air force); Dexter Filkins, In Taking Falluja Mosque, Victory by the Inch, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 
27, 2004, at A1; Carlotta Gall, Americans Face Rising Threat from Taliban, INT’L HERALD 
TRIB. (N.Y.C.), July 15, 2008, at 4; Jeremy Rabkin, The Fantasy World of International 
Law: The Criticism of Israel Has Been Disproportionate, WKLY. STANDARD, Aug. 21, 
2006, at 27. 
55 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, OFF TARGET: THE CONDUCT OF THE WAR AND CIVILIAN 
CASUALTIES IN IRAQ 72–73 (2003) (quoting Geneva Convention IV, supra note 12, art. 18) 
(criticizing the use of hospitals as headquarters by the Iraqi military). 
56 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, SCHOOLS AND ARMED CONFLICT 5 (2011), available at 
http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/crd0711webwcover.pdf. One mother in 
Thailand explained, for example, after removing her children from a school occupied by 
paramilitary forces for two years, “when they moved into the school, I feared there would 
be an attack on the school, so that is the reason I withdrew my children. . . . [I]f there was 
an attack on the grounds, the children would be hit as well.” Id. 
57 Additional Protocol I, supra note 12, art. 52(1). 
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belligerent.”58 The second paragraph of that article offers examples of military 
objectives: “military forces; military works; military establishments or depots; 
manufacturing plants constituting important and well-known centres for the 
production of arms, ammunition, or characterized military supplies; lines of 
communication or of transport which are used for military purposes.”59 Although 
the 1923 Hague Rules were never adopted as a binding legal instrument, they 
remain important “as an authoritative attempt to clarify and formulate rules of law 
governing the use of aircraft in war.”60 
Other early categorizations of military objectives included steel works, motor 
and engineering works, docks and dockside warehouses, waterworks, gasworks, 
refining and oil storage depots, and oil wells, for example. 61  Finally, one 
comprehensive survey looking back at the understanding of the notion of military 
objective at the end of World War II presents the following list of items considered 
to be military targets: 
 
military equipment, units, and bases; economic targets; power sources 
(coal, oil, electric, hydroelectric); industry (war supporting 
manufacturing, export and/or import); transportation (equipment, lines of 
communication, and petroleum, oil, and other lubricants necessary for 
transportation); command and control; geographic; personnel; military; 
and civilians taking part in the hostilities, including civilians working in 
industries directly related to the war effort.62 
 
Although the 1949 Geneva Conventions reference the term “military objective,” 
the drafters of the conventions did not include any definition in the treaties. 
At the time of the drafting of the Additional Protocols in 1977, the drafters 
recognized the need for a comprehensive definition “if the essential distinction 
between combatants and civilians and between civilian objects and military 
objectives was to be maintained.” 63  Article 52 of Additional Protocol I thus 
contains the definition of military objective, which is considered to be customary 
international law.64 First, Article 52(1) declares that “[c]ivilian objects shall not be 
the object of attack or of reprisals” and defines civilian objects as “all objects 
58 Rules Concerning the Control of Wireless Telegraphy in Time of War and Air 
Warfare art. 24(1), drafted Dec. 1922–Feb. 1923, reprinted in THE LAWS OF ARMED 
CONFLICTS, supra note 48, at 315. 
59 Id. art. 24(2). 
60 2 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW: A TREATISE 519 (H. Lauterpacht ed., 7th 
ed. 1948), quoted in THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICTS, supra note 48, at 315. 
61 A.P.V. ROGERS, LAW ON THE BATTLEFIELD 30 (1996) (citing J. STONE, LEGAL 
CONTROLS OF INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT 624 (1954)). 
62 W. Hays Parks, Air War and the Law of War, 32 A.F. L. REV. 1, 55 (1990). 
63 CLAUDE PILLOUD ET AL., supra note 10, at 631. 
64 THEODOR MERON, HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN NORMS AS CUSTOMARY 
LAW 64–65 (1989). 
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which are not military objectives.”65 Like the definition of civilian in Article 50 of 
Additional Protocol I, 66  the definition of civilian object is a negative one, 
dependent on the definition of military objective, which appears in Article 52(2): 
 
In so far as objects are concerned, military objectives are limited to those 
objects which by their nature, location, purpose or use make an effective 
contribution to military action and whose total or partial destruction, 
capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a 
definite military advantage.67 
 
The definition includes four criteria for determining whether a particular object 
qualifies as a military objective by making an effective contribution to military 
action—nature, location, use, or purpose. 
Nature refers to “all objects directly used by the armed forces: weapons, 
equipment, transports, fortifications, depots, buildings occupied by armed forces, 
staff headquarters, communications centres, etc.” 68  Thus, military bases, units, 
equipment and forces, for example, can be attacked at any time. These are objects 
that are inherently military, that is, they have “intrinsic military significance”69 and 
by their nature make an effective contribution to military action. Targeting such 
objects fits directly within the concept of military necessity as understood in the 
Lieber Code and subsequent LOAC treaties and commentary—the authority to 
take all measures not forbidden by the law that are indispensable for securing the 
complete submission of the enemy70—because they enable the opposing forces to 
wage war. Two extensive lists of objects that are inherently military by nature offer 
useful guidance for understanding the concept of “nature” in the definition of 
military objective. The first, drawn up by the International Committee of the Red 
Cross (ICRC) in 1956 as an annex to the Draft Rules for the Limitation of Dangers 
incurred by the Civilian Population in Time of War, includes: 
 
(2) Positions, installations or constructions occupied by the [armed] 
forces . . . as well as combat objectives (that is to say, those objectives 
which are directly contested in battle between land or sea forces 
including airborne forces). 
(3) Installations, constructions and other works of a military nature, such 
as barracks, fortifications, War Ministries (e.g. Ministries of Army, 
Navy, Air Force, National Defence, Supply) and other organs for the 
direction and administration of military operations. 
65 Additional Protocol I, supra note 12, art. 52(1). 
66  Id. art. 50(1) (“A civilian is any person who does not belong to one of the 
categories of persons referred to in Article 4 A (1), (2), (3) and (6) of the Third Convention 
and in Article 43 of this Protocol.”). 
67 Additional Protocol I, supra note 12, art. 52(2). 
68 PILLOUD ET AL., supra note 10, at 636. 
69 Schmitt, supra note 37, at 280. 
70 THE LIEBER CODE, supra note 48, art. 14. 
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(4) Stores of arms or military sup[p]lies, such as munition dumps, stores 
of equipment or fuel, vehicles parks. 
(5) Airfields, rocket launching ramps and naval base installations. 
(6) Those of the lines and means of communications (railway lines, 
roads, bridges, tunnels and canals) which are of fundamental military 
importance. 
(7) The installations of broadcasting and television stations; telephone 
and telegraph exchanges of fundamental military importance. 
(8) Industries of fundamental importance for the conduct of the war: 
(a) industries for the manufacture of armaments such as 
weapons, munitions, rockets, armoured vehicles, military 
aircraft, fighting ships, including the manufacture of 
accessories and all other war material; 
(b) industries for the manufacture of supplies and material of a 
military character, such as transport and communications 
material, equipment of the armed forces; 
(c) factories or plant[s] constituting other production and 
manufacturing centres of fundamental importance for the 
conduct of war, such as the metallurgical, engineering and 
chemical industries, whose nature or purpose is essentially 
military; 
(d) storage and transport installations whose basic function it is 
to serve the industries referred to in (a)–(c); 
(e) installations providing energy mainly for national defence, 
e.g. coal, other fuels, or atomic energy, and plants producing 
gas or electricity mainly for military consumption. 
(9) Installations constituting experimental, research centres for 
experiments on and the development of weapons and war material.71 
 
The second commonly relied-upon list is the following one drawn up by Major 
General A.P.V. Rogers, a former Director of British Army Legal Services, using 
the Additional Protocol I definition and his own review of state practice: 
 
military personnel and persons who take part in the fighting without 
being members of the armed forces; military facilities, military 
equipment, including military vehicles, weapons, munitions and stores of 
fuel, military works, including defensive works and fortifications, 
military depots and establishments, including War and Supply 
Ministries; works producing or developing military supplies and other 
supplies of military value, including metallurgical, engineering and 
chemical industries supporting the war effort; areas of land of military 
significance such as hills, defiles and bridgeheads; railways, ports, 
airfields, bridges, main roads as well as tunnels and canals; oil and other 
71 PILLOUD ET AL., supra note 10, at 632–33 n.3. 
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power installations; communications installations, including broadcasting 
and television stations and telephone and telegraph stations used for 
military communications.72 
 
The lists excerpted above include a fairly comprehensive collection of objects 
that fall within the category of “nature”—that is, they have an intrinsically military 
character. For most of these objects, their use at a given moment is not necessarily 
relevant—barring use for a distinct civilian purpose, such as using empty military 
barracks to house civilian refugees—because they automatically contribute to the 
enemy’s ability to wage war and therefore their destruction, neutralization, or 
capture offers a definite military advantage. 
Location is an important factor because certain objects, such as bridges, make 
a direct contribution to military action regardless of whether they have a military 
function. Another example could be a particular site that is critical for military 
operations because it must be seized, or because it is important to prevent the 
enemy from seizing it, or to force the enemy to retreat from it. It is generally 
accepted that a certain area of land can be a military objective by virtue of its 
location, although in most cases, “there must be a distinctive feature turning a 
piece of land into a military objective (e.g., an important mountain pass; a trail in 
the jungle or in a swamp area; a bridgehead; or a spit of land controlling the 
entrance of a harbour).”73 
The categories of “use” and “purpose” refer respectively to an object’s present 
or intended function and will often involve objects that do not appear to be military 
upon first impression, thus requiring further examination in given situations. An 
example of use that would cause an object to be classified as a military objective 
would be school buses, or private taxis, 74 used to transport troops to the front 
during conflict. Purpose, in contrast, depends on the enemy’s intended future use 
of an object and must inherently be based on intelligence gathering and analysis 
regarding the enemy’s intentions. Thus, “[w]hen reliable intelligence or other 
information indicates that the enemy intends to use an object militarily in the 
future, the object qualifies as a military objective through ‘purpose.’” 75  The 
Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Commission relied on this criterion for the definition of 
military objective in holding that the Hirgigo Power Station in Eritrea was a lawful 
military objective, liable to attack by Ethiopian forces. The power station was 
under construction and, once completed, would have provided power to the nearby 
72 ROGERS, supra note 61, at 37. Another useful list appears in DINSTEIN, supra note 
37, at 88. 
73 DINSTEIN, supra note 37, at 92. 
74 During World War I, the “Taxis of the Marne” were commandeered to bring French 
reserve units to the front line; once they were used in that manner, they became legitimate 
military objectives even though when they served their normal purpose—private taxis—
they were civilian objects. See id. at 90 (citing GEORG SCHWARZENBERGER, 2 
INTERNATIONAL LAW AS APPLIED BY INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS: THE LAW 
OF ARMED CONFLICT 112 (1968)). 
75 Schmitt, supra note 37, at 280. 
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port and naval base. As the Commission explained, “a State at war should not be 
obligated to wait until an object is, in fact, put into use when the purpose of that 
object is such that it will make an effective contribution to military action once it 
has been tested, commissioned and put to use.”76 
These four criteria are used to determine whether the object in question makes 
an effective contribution to military action—by its nature, location, use, or 
purpose. The definition of military objective contains a second requirement as 
well, that the destruction, capture or neutralization of the object offers a definite 
military advantage. Here, the benefit from the attack—the military advantage—
cannot be simply hypothetical or speculative. As the Commentary to Additional 
Protocol I explains, “[I]t is not legitimate to launch an attack which only offers 
potential or indeterminate advantages.” 77  The concept of definite military 
advantage can thus often be hard to quantify: at one level, the destruction or 
neutralization of any object that makes an effective contribution to military action 
would seem to offer a definite military advantage. Indeed, as some commentators 
have explained, 
 
In practice, . . . one cannot imagine that the destruction, capture, or 
neutralization of an object contributing to the military action of one side 
would not be militarily advantageous for the enemy; it is just as difficult 
to imagine how the destruction, capture, or neutralization of an object 
could be a military advantage for one side if that same object did not 
somehow contribute to the military action of the enemy.78 
 
However, any assessment of military advantage must be made in light of the 
circumstances prevailing at the time, such that a civilian object would not offer a 
definite military advantage at one moment but then could indeed qualify as such if 
being used as a command post, to store weapons or to launch attacks. 
Military advantage also is not limited solely to the tactical gains from the 
particular attack or parts of an attack, but extends to the attack as a whole and to 
the security of the attacking force.79 As an example, the attacking party may see a 
definite military advantage in an attack that causes the defending party to focus its 
strategic and tactical energies on one sector, leaving another sector unprotected. 
Alternatively, a “classic example involves an attack constituting a ruse intended to 
cause the enemy to believe an operation is to take place at other than its intended 
76 Western Front, Aerial Bombardment and Related Claims (Eri. v. Eth.), 26 R.I.A.A. 
291, 334–35 (Eri.-Eth. Claims Comm’n 2005). 
77 See PILLOUD ET AL., supra note 10, at 636. 
78 1 MARCO SASSÒLI ET AL., HOW DOES LAW PROTECT IN WAR? 252 n.196 (3d ed., 
2011). 
79 See, e.g., U.K. MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, JSP 383: THE JOINT SERVICE MANUAL OF 
THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 5.4.4(j) (2004) (“The military advantage anticipated from 
an attack refers to the advantage anticipated from the attack considered as a whole and not 
only from isolated or particular parts of the attack. The advantage need not be 
immediate.”). 
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location.”80 The immediate military advantage of destroying the physical target of 
the attack may be small, but the actual military advantage—to the extent the enemy 
is fooled regarding the actual location of the operation—“can prove significant.”81 
The Allied bombing of bridges and railroad tracks in the Pas de Calais region of 
France before the invasion at Normandy offered just such an advantage: “[t]he 
Germans were convinced that the invasion would occur in the Pas de Calais, 
thereby diverting the Germans from Normandy.”82 
Although Additional Protocol I applies, as a matter of treaty law, only to 
international armed conflicts, these rules for determining when objects constitute 
military objectives apply in both international and non-international armed conflict 
as a matter of customary law as well.83 Furthermore, several treaties applicable in 
non-international armed conflict incorporate this definition of military objective, 
including Amended Protocol II to the Convention on Certain Conventional 
Weapons84 and the Second Protocol to the Hague Convention for the Protection of 
Cultural Property. 85  As the following section discusses, the nature of non-
international armed conflicts, and of the non-state entities that fight in such 
conflicts, raises a range of interesting and challenging questions about how the 
definition of military objective applies, and should apply, in such situations. 
 
III.  IDENTIFYING MILITARY OBJECTIVES IN CONFLICTS WITH NON-STATE 
ACTORS: THE CHALLENGES OF POSITIVE IDENTIFICATION 
 
Several components of the definition of military objective and aspects of the 
identification of objects in accordance with that definition play out differently in 
conflicts with non-state actors than in the classic international armed conflict. Non-
international armed conflicts can take a variety of forms, some of which present 
80 Michael N. Schmitt, Targeting in Operational Law, in THE HANDBOOK OF THE 
INTERNATIONAL LAW OF MILITARY OPERATIONS 245, 254 (Terry D. Gill & Dieter Fleck 
eds., 2010). 
81 Id. 
82 Jeanne M. Meyer, Tearing Down the Facade: A Critical Look at the Current Law 
on Targeting the Will of The Enemy and Air Force Doctrine, 51 A.F. L. REV. 143, 173 
(2001). 
83 1 HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK, supra note 9, at 29. 
84 Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and 
Other Devices as Amended on 3 May 1996 (Protocol II as amended on 3 May 1996) 
annexed to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain 
Conventional Weapons which may be deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to have 
Indiscriminate Effects art. 2, para. 6, May 3, 1996, 2048 U.N.T.S. 93. 
85 Second Protocol to the Hague Convention of 1954 for the Protection of Cultural 
Property in the Event of Armed Conflict art. 1(f), opened for signature May 17, 1999, 2253 
U.N.T.S. 172. Protocol III to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, made 
applicable in non-international armed conflicts pursuant to an amendment of Article 1 of 
the Convention adopted by consensus in 2001, also includes this definition of military 
objective. See Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Incendiary Weapons 
(Protocol III) art. 1, para. 3, opened for signature Apr. 10, 1981, 1342 U.N.T.S. 171. 
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additional complications for either the determination of military objectives or the 
operational decision-making process regarding the lawfulness of attacking such 
objectives. It is important to note, at the outset, that some of these challenges arise 
directly within LOAC and relate to how the definition of military objectives is or 
should be applied; others stem from jus ad bellum or other legal paradigms 
relevant to the use of force against a non-state actor, or lie within the operational 
realm. 
To that end, consider the different forms a conflict with a non-state actor can 
take: a purely internal conflict between a government and an organized armed 
group; a conflict between two or more organized armed groups within a single 
State; a conflict between the government and an organized armed group that spills 
over into one or more neighboring States; a cross-border conflict in which 
government forces combat an organized armed group operating from the territory 
of a neighboring State; a conflict in which multi-national forces fight alongside, or 
in support of, the host government in its conflict with one or more organized armed 
groups;86 or a conflict between government forces and an organized armed group 
operating transnationally with hostilities occurring in and across the territory  
of several States. 87  Debates surrounding the characterization of conflict with 
transnational terrorist groups as armed conflicts triggering LOAC are outside the 
scope of this Article; for the purposes of the instant analysis, it is simply important 
to note that non-international armed conflicts include a variety of conflict scenarios 
not limited to fighting within the confines of a single State. 88  The difference 
86 See Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross [ICRC], International Humanitarian Law and 
the Challenges of Contemporary Armed Conflict, at 9–11, ICRC Doc. 31IC/11/5.1.2, (Oct. 
2011). 
87 See, e.g., Geoffrey S. Corn, Hamdan, Lebanon, and the Regulation of Hostilities: 
The Need to Recognize a Hybrid Category of Armed Conflict, 40 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 
295, 299–300 (2007) (calling for the recognition of a hybrid category of “transnational 
armed conflict” triggering the application of the foundational principles of laws of war); 
Geoffrey Corn & Eric Talbot Jensen, Transnational Armed Conflict: A “Principled” 
Approach to the Regulation of Counter-Terror Combat Operations, 42 ISR. L. REV. 46, 78–
79 (2009) (arguing that counter-terror military operations should be regulated by 
fundamental principles of the LOAC). 
88 Although debate continues regarding the characterization of the United States’ 
struggle with al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups as an armed conflict, there is a general 
consensus that the United States is engaged in a non-international armed conflict with al-
Qaeda. Much of the debate surrounds the parameters of that conflict—whether it includes 
all instances in which U.S. forces engage with al-Qaeda and associated forces wherever 
that occurs, or whether the existence of an armed conflict between the two parties must be 
determined on an individual basis in each geographical location affected. All three 
branches of the U.S. government have demonstrated that they view the situation as an 
armed conflict. See Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, § 2(a), 
115 Stat. 224 (2001) (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1541 note); Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 
557, 628 (2006); Military Order of November 13, 2001, § 1(a), 3 C.F.R. 918 (2002) 
(stating that the September 11th attacks “created a state of armed conflict that requires the 
use of the United States Armed Forces”); Procedures for Trials by Military Commissions 
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between a conflict occurring solely within the territory of the State fighting against 
the organized armed group and a conflict in which a State is fighting an organized 
armed group in the neighboring State, or perhaps operating in a number of 
locations around the world, can present significant interpretive and operational 
differences in the application and implementation of the definition of military 
objectives and the obligations of distinction the definition mandates. 
 
A.  “Nature” 
 
As the Commentary explains, “nature” refers to all objects directly used by 
the armed forces. A look at the lists proffered—some of which are reproduced or 
excerpted above—as examples of objects that are military by nature evinces a 
broad understanding of what it means to be military by nature. Not only are 
military depots, tanks, aircraft and other military equipment included in this 
category, but also roadways, industries producing components of war materiel, and 
communications networks, for example. In an international armed conflict, this 
broad conception of “nature” flows naturally from the principle of military 
necessity and is based on the State’s control over these networks, resources and 
industries. Non-international armed conflict—in particular the identification of 
targets on the non-state actor side of the equation—introduce additional 
considerations, however. When there is no state actor, does the notion of “nature” 
change? And, if so, in what ways does it change? 
 
1.  The Nature of the Non-State Actor 
 
The type of non-international armed conflict and the role of the non-state 
actor can have a significant impact on how “nature” should be interpreted. At one 
extreme, many non-state armed groups do not control any significant territory or 
any infrastructure. In such situations, it is reasonable to conclude that only the 
group’s military equipment and installations, to the extent they have bases or other 
of Certain Non-United States Citizens in the War Against Terrorism, 32 C.F.R. §§ 9.1, 9.3 
(2012); see also U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, REPLY OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES 
OF AMERICA TO THE REPORT OF THE FIVE UNHCR SPECIAL RAPPORTEURS ON DETAINEES 
IN GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA 4 (Mar. 10, 2006), available at http://www.asil.org/pdfs/ 
ilib0603212.pdf (“[T]he United States is engaged in a continuing armed conflict against Al 
Qaida, the Taliban and other terrorist organizations supporting them, with troops on the 
ground in several places engaged in combat operations.”); Harold Hongju Koh, Legal 
Adviser, U.S. Dep’t of State, Speech at the Annual Meeting of the American Society of 
International Law: The Obama Administration and International Law (Mar. 25, 2010), 
available at http://www.state.gov/s/l/releases/remarks/139119.htm (“[T]he United States is 
in an armed conflict with al-Qaeda, as well as the Taliban and associated forces . . . .”). The 
U.S. characterization of the conflict does not depend on geographical or territorial lines. In 
contrast, for example, “the ICRC does not share the view that a conflict of global 
dimensions is or has been taking place,” and instead favors a case-by-case analysis of the 
various situations in question. See ICRC, supra note 86, at 10–11. 
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headquarters, could fit within the category of “nature” in defining objects as 
military objectives. For example, during the conflict in the Philippines between the 
government and multiple insurgent groups, the government forces attacked the 
“Bangsamoro Islamic Armed Forces (BIAF)’s 113th Base Command.”89 Similarly, 
Turkish warplanes have attacked PKK ammunition depots in Iraqi Kurdistan.90 
However, other objects listed in the 1956 ICRC list or other compilations of 
objects of a military “nature” no longer seem to fit in that category—industries, 
roadways, communications networks, war ministries, and the like—because they 
are not within the non-state actor’s authority in any way. For example, television 
and broadcast stations, which appear on both the ICRC list and the list drawn up 
by Major General Rogers, are often identified as legitimate military objectives in 
conflicts between States.91 Thus, when NATO bombed the Serbian Radio and TV 
Station (RTS) during Operation Allied Force in 1999, the broadcasting station was 
a lawful military objective as “part of a more general attack aimed at disrupting the 
FRY Command, Control and Communications network, the nerve centre and 
apparatus that keeps Milosević in power.”92 Similarly, in July 2011, NATO forces 
implementing the U.N. Security Council Resolution authorizing the use of force to 
protect civilians in Libya bombed the state television satellite transmitters in 
Tripoli because it was “an integral component of the regime apparatus designed to 
systematically oppress and threaten civilians.” 93  These broadcast stations were 
89 MILF Claims AFP Attacked Its Forces in Zambo Sibugay, GMA NEWS ONLINE 
(Oct. 22, 2011, 2:14 PM), http://www.gmanetwork.com/news/story/236222/news/nation/ 
milf-claims-afp-attacked-its-forces-in-zambo-sibugay. 
90 Turkish Military Jets Strike Kurdish PKK Targets in Iraqi Kurdistan, KURD NET 
(Dec. 27, 2012), http://www.ekurd.net/mismas/articles/misc2012/12/turkey4379.htm. 
91 See DINSTEIN, supra note 37, at 98 (“[I]t is noteworthy that the Hague Cultural 
Property Convention of 1954 refers to any ‘broadcasting station’ as a military objective (in 
the same breath as an aerodrome and a port).”) (quoting Convention for the Protection of 
Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, art. 8(1)(a), opened for signature May 
14, 1954, S. EXEC. REP. 110-26, 249 U.N.T.S. 240). 
92  INT’L CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGO., FINAL REPORT TO THE 
PROSECUTOR BY THE COMMITTEE ESTABLISHED TO REVIEW THE NATO BOMBING 
CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA para. 75 (2000) [hereinafter 
NATO BOMBING REPORT], reprinted in 39 I.L.M. 1257 (2000); see also W.J. Fenrick, 
Targeting and Proportionality During the NATO Bombing Campaign Against Yugoslavia, 
12 EUR. J. INT’L L. 489, 496 (2001) (“RTS would be a military objective if it was integrated 
into the military command, control or communications system.”). There was extensive 
criticism of the decision to target the RTS broadcast station, from both human rights 
organizations and from other States, including coalition partners within NATO. See 
Amnesty Int’l, NATO/Federal Republic of Yugoslavia: “Collateral Damage” or Unlawful 
Killings?: Violations of the Laws of War by NATO During Operation Allied Force, AI 
Index EUR 70/18/2000 (June 5, 2000); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, CIVILIAN DEATHS IN THE 
NATO AIR CAMPAIGN 30 (2000). 
93  Press Release, N. Atl. Treaty Org., NATO Strikes Libyan State TV Satellite 
Facility (July 30, 2011) [hereinafter NATO Press Release], available at http://www.nato.int
/cps/en/SID-82983FF0-6E3BF21C/natolive/ news_76776.htm. 
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military objectives regardless of whether the State was actually using them as 
communications networks at the time of the attack because they were part of the 
communications network the State used in advance of its military effort (although 
in both cases, the State was using them directly in furtherance of its own 
objectives). In contrast, in the case of the non-state armed group, a broadcast 
station could certainly be a lawful military objective, but would likely only meet 
that definition as a result of the group’s use of the station. 
Where a non-state armed group controls or administers territory, this 
conclusion regarding where a broadcast station—or other communications network 
equipment—fits in the definition of military objective might be entirely different. 
Imagine that the rebel forces in Libya set up their own broadcast network for a 
variety of purposes. At that point, the analysis would likely be the same as that for 
the State as in the examples from Libya and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
above. In the context of a conflict between a State and a non-state actor operating 
in the territory of the neighboring State, however, the notion of “nature” would be 
similarly more limited in most situations. Lebanese television stations, for 
example, would not be military by nature in a conflict between Israel and 
Hezbollah in southern Lebanon. Such stations could well constitute military 
objectives nonetheless if Hezbollah were using them as part of a communications 
or command and control network, but under the criterion of “use,” not “nature.” In 
contrast, Hezbollah’s own television station was a target of Israeli attack during the 
2006 Israel-Hezbollah conflict because, according to Israeli analysis, Hezbollah’s 
al-Manar broadcast station served as a central communications and recruitment 
tool for Hezbollah.94 The distinctions between these various classifications of the 
same type of object highlight how the various components of the definition of 
military objectives can differ in conflicts with non-state actors. 
As a result, the concept of “nature” as a definitional component of military 
objective must be understood differently in conflicts with non-state actors. It will 
also vary across the different types of conflicts with non-state actors. It is 
important to emphasize, however, that this varying conception of “nature” does not 
necessarily mean that fewer objects will constitute lawful military objectives in 
such conflicts. Rather, the operational consequences will be insignificant in most 
cases because most of these “nature” objects will also fall within the “use” or 
“purpose” categories; the difference lies in the legal analysis of determining why 
objects satisfy the definition of military objective. 
 
94 See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WHY THEY DIED: CIVILIAN CASUALTIES IN LEBANON 
DURING THE 2006 WAR 75 (2007), available at http://www.hrw.org/sites/defaultz/files/ 
reports/lebanon0907.pdf; Summary of IDF Operations Against Hizbullah in Lebanon, ISR. 
MINISTRY FOREIGN AFF. (July 13, 2006), http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Terrorism+Obstacle
+to+Peace/Terrorism+from+Lebanon-+Hizbullah/IDF+operations+against+Hizbullah+in+
Lebanon+13-Jul-2006.htm; Hezbollah’s Al-Manar Television Station Legitimate Target of 
Israeli Response, FOUND. FOR DEF. DEMOCRACIES (July 13, 2006), http://www.defenddemo
cracy.org/media-hit/hezbollahs-al-manar-television-station-legitimate-target-of-israeli-respons. 
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2.  The Special Case of Terrorist Groups Governing Territory 
 
The type of non-state armed group—domestic rebel group, transnational 
terrorist organization, cross-border insurgency—involved in the conflict does not 
necessarily impact the military objective analysis. However, in cases of terrorist 
entities, the different perceptions of the group’s purposes and activities can be an 
important factor. For example, the nature of Hamas as a terrorist organization 
governing a non-state entity and engaging in terrorism and insurgent warfare 
introduces challenging questions with regard to the specifics of the definition of 
military objectives. The perception of how and if such organizations have non-
military or non-terrorist activities and infrastructure bears directly on the analysis 
of which objects constitute military objectives in the case of armed conflict. 
During Operation Cast Lead, the conflict between Israel and Hamas and other 
Palestinian groups from December 2008 to January 2009, for example, this issue 
proved consequential in the legal analysis of Israeli targeting decisions. 95  The 
Israel Defense Forces targeted a broad swath of government buildings and civilian 
political infrastructure in Gaza, including civilian ministries, the al-Saraya prison 
and the Palestinian Legislative Council building.96 In response to criticism of these 
strikes, the Israel Defense Forces explained, 
 
While Hamas operates ministries and is in charge of a variety of 
administrative and traditionally governmental functions in the Gaza 
Strip, it still remains a terrorist organisation. Many of the ostensibly 
civilian elements of its regime are in reality active components of its 
terrorist and military efforts. Indeed, Hamas does not separate its civilian 
and military activities in the manner in which a legitimate government 
might. Instead, Hamas uses apparatuses under its control, including 
quasi-governmental institutions, to promote its terrorist activity.97 
 
In essence, therefore, Hamas’s terrorist activities turned all Hamas infrastructure 
into terrorist—or enemy military—infrastructure. The Goldstone Report, in 
contrast, found that such buildings could not be military objectives because they 
were not “war ministries,” the only types of ministries on the two lists of military 
objectives referenced above.98 
Although the Israeli position that all Hamas buildings were part of the 
terrorist infrastructure and therefore legitimate targets is a clear broadening of the 
95 STATE OF ISR., THE OPERATION IN GAZA 27 DECEMBER 2008–18 JANUARY 2009: 
FACTUAL AND LEGAL ASPECTS 86–89 (2009). 
96 See U.N. Human Rights Council, Human Rights In Palestine and Other Occupied 
Arab Territories, Rep. of the U.N. Fact-Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict, 12th Sess., 
paras. 32, 364–77, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/12/48 (2009) [hereinafter Goldstone Report] 
(describing attacks on Palestinian Legislative Council building and Gaza al-Sarayah 
prison); STATE OF ISR., supra note 95, at 89 (discussing attacks on “civilian ministries”). 
97 STATE OF ISR., supra note 95, at 89. 
98 Goldstone Report, supra note 96, paras. 385–87. 
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category of military objectives and legitimate targets, the opposing viewpoint is 
equally notable in its narrow interpretation of the definition of military objectives. 
Hamas has no “war ministry,” but rather multiple armed entities engaged in 
operations against Israel, making this distinction too elementary. The Interior 
Ministry, for example, oversees “Hamas-controlled government forces in Gaza.”99 
According to Article 52(2) and the ICRC’s list of military objectives, it meets the 
standard of a military objective because it makes an effective contribution to 
military action and its neutralization or destruction would offer a direct military 
advantage for Israel by eliminating or curtailing the ability of those forces to 
engage in combat. Moreover, the ICRC list specifically mentions “other organs for 
the direction and administration of military objectives” as legitimate military 
objectives.100 Given the nature of Hamas’s infrastructure, a number of its buildings 
would so qualify.101 
These examples from Operation Cast Lead demonstrate the challenges in 
assessing the relationship between a so-called political wing and military wing of a 
terrorist organization and the impact of that relationship on the definition of 
military objectives as applied to components of the organization’s infrastructure. 
Neither the broad approach nor the narrow interpretation is satisfying in light of 
the factual realities; such approaches seem too simplistic for the complexities of 
the situation. At a minimum, however, unease with the all-or-nothing dichotomy 
presented in the legal analyses of targeting in Operation Cast Lead highlights the 
need for a more nuanced understanding of the criterion of “nature” in the definition 
of military objectives and its interpretation in different types of conflicts with non-
state actors. Beyond that, the concept of “nature” begins to give way to the 
concepts of “use” or “purpose” in these situations: because defining the parameters 
of “nature” becomes difficult due to the qualities and characteristics of the non-
state actor and its overall role and activities, “nature” becomes a narrower category 
and less prominent in the military objective analysis. 
 
B.  Use . . . or Dual Use? 
 
In all conflicts, the line between military and civilian objects can be hard to 
draw and is often blurry at best. Many buildings—schools, residential buildings, 
post offices, hotels, and the like—are civilian in nature but might be used 
extensively for military purposes. As the Commentary to the Additional Protocols 
explains, “a school or a hotel is a civilian object, but if . . . used to accommodate 
99 Nidal al-Mughrabi, Israel Flattens Hamas Ministry in Gaza Strip, REUTERS (Jan. 
18, 2008, 8:40 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2008/01/19/us-palestinians-israel-idUS
L1730626720080119; see also DINSTEIN, supra note 37, at 98 (noting that while a 
“sweeping allusion” to all government buildings as legitimate targets “is wrong,” 
nonetheless “[g]overnment offices can be considered legitimate targets for attack only 
when used in pursuance or support of military functions”). 
100 NATO BOMBING REPORT, supra note 92, para. 39. 
101  See MATTHEW LEVITT, HAMAS: POLITICS, CHARITY, AND TERRORISM IN THE 
SERVICE OF JIHAD 97 (2006). 
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troops or headquarters staff, [it will] become [a] military objective[].”102 Examples 
of civilian objects that make an effective contribution to military action could 
include “civilian buses or trucks which are being transported to the front to move 
soldiers from point A to point B, [or] a factory which is producing ball bearings for 
the military.”103 In such situations, the analysis under Article 52(2) of Additional 
Protocol I centers on whether the use of the object in question makes an effective 
contribution to military action—the first part of the definition of military 
objective—and whether its destruction, capture, or neutralization offers a definite 
military advantage. During the Croatian operation to retake the Krajina region in 
the summer of 1995, the ICTY thus found that the post office in Knin (the capital 
of the self-proclaimed Republic of Serbian Krajina) and a screws and bolts factory 
believed to be a logistics supply facility and ammunition components factory were 
lawful military objectives. First, the post office was thought to be used as a 
communications center for the Serb forces in the Krajina (SVK) and the 
government of the Republic of Serbian Krajina—fulfilling the “use” criterion of 
the definition of military objective. 104  Second, because there was “evidence 
[indicating] that the SVK planned to produce weapons-related products at the . . . 
factory,” the factory was a lawful military objective within the “purpose” criterion 
of Article 52(2).105 
The term “dual-use” takes the blurring of civilian and military objects yet 
another step and refers to objects that simultaneously have a civilian and military 
use. In nearly all conflicts, “the military uses civilian infrastructure, 
telecommunications and logistics also for military purposes. In industrialized 
countries power-generating stations are crucial for civilian access to clean water, 
but they also provide power to war industries—and in an integrated power grid all 
stations provide power to both.” 106  The term is thus most often applied to 
infrastructure, such as electricity-generating plants or oil refineries, that serves 
both functions at the same time. In other words, the dual-use description is 
applicable “not when a facility sometimes serves civilian purposes and sometimes 
serves military purposes, [as in the examples above,] but rather when it 
102 PILLOUD ET AL., supra note 10, at 636; see, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra 
note 56, at 5 (describing how paramilitary forces in Thailand occupied schools for two 
years during the conflict there). 
103 INT’L & OPERATIONAL LAW DEP’T, THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GEN.’S LEGAL CTR. & 
SCH., OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK 20 (Brian Bill & Jeremy Marsh eds., 2010). 
104 Prosecutor v. Ante Gotovina, Case No. IT-06-90-T, Judgement, ¶ 1899 (Int’l Crim. 
Trib. For the Former Yugoslavia Apr. 15, 2011), available at http://www.icty.org/x/cases/g
otovina/tjug/en/110415_judgement_vol2.pdf 
105 Id. ¶ 1902. 
106  MARCO SASSÒLI, LEGITIMATE TARGETS OF ATTACKS UNDER INTERNATIONAL 
HUMANITARIAN LAW 7 (2003), available at http://www.hpcrresearch.org/sites/default/files/ 
publications/Session1.pdf. 
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continuously serves both civilian purposes and military purposes.”107 As one of the 
authoritative commentaries on Additional Protocol I explains, civilian 
transportation hubs and other civilian objects contributing to military operations 
can constitute military objectives: 
 
The objects classified as military objectives under this definition include 
much more than strictly military objects such as military vehicles, 
weapons, munitions, stores of fuel and fortifications. Provided the 
objects meet the two-pronged test, under the circumstances ruling at the 
time (not at some hypothetical future time), military objectives include 
activities providing administrative and logistical support to military 
operations such as transportation and communications systems, railroads, 
airfields and port facilities and industries of fundamental importance for 
the conduct of the armed conflict.108 
 
A first question in conflicts with non-state actors is whether nearly everything 
is essentially dual-use, because of the intermingling of the non-state group with the 
civilian population and—in many cases—its lack of territorial control or governing 
authority. As noted in Part II.A above, the concept of “nature” narrows 
considerably when analyzing the types of military objectives in such conflicts 
because, in many cases, non-state armed groups have very little in the way of 
buildings, property, or other objects that are inherently military in nature as 
described in the 1956 ICRC list or other lists of military objectives.109 In addition, 
because most non-state armed groups operate in and among the civilian population, 
few objects that qualify as military objectives due to “use” or “purpose” will be 
solely military in that use or purpose—whether “rocket villages” in southern 
Lebanon that are also home to hundreds of civilians, or schools used by 
paramilitaries in Thailand while classes are still ongoing, or hospitals storing 
rockets in Gaza while patients are being treated on floors just above. When every 
target becomes a dual-use target, the targeting process becomes more complex, 
107  Henry Shue & David Wippman, Limiting Attacks on Dual-Use Facilities 
Performing Indispensable Civilian Functions, 35 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 559, 562 (2002); see 
also SASSÒLI, supra note 106, at 7; Meyer, supra note 82, at 178. 
108  MICHAEL BOTHE ET AL., NEW RULES FOR VICTIMS OF ARMED CONFLICTS: 
COMMENTARY ON THE TWO 1977 PROTOCOLS ADDITIONAL TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS 
OF 1949, at 323–24 (1982); see also Carolin Wuerzner, Mission Impossible? Bringing 
Charges for the Crime of Attacking Civilians or Civilian Objects Before International 
Criminal Tribunals, 90 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 907, 918–19 (2008) (“With many objects, 
including communications systems, transport systems, manufacturing plants and so on, the 
question of how to classify them is of great importance . . . . As a general rule, it can be 
said that as soon as the object is actually (not potentially) used for military purposes, or 
where its secondary use is military, it is a military objective and may, in principle, be 
attacked.”). 
109 See supra Part II.A. 
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both operationally and legally, specifically with regard to the application of the 
principle of proportionality. 
Applicable at all times and in all conflicts, proportionality is an essential 
component of the protections LOAC provides for civilians, the civilian population 
and civilian property in all conflicts, international or non-international. 110  The 
principle of proportionality mandates that commanders must refrain from any 
attack in which the expected civilian casualties will be excessive in light of the 
anticipated military advantage.111 However, proportionality only applies to attacks 
where the commander expects some civilian damage; if there are no civilians or 
civilian property at risk from the attack, the proportionality analysis is not 
relevant. 112  Even in the case of erstwhile civilian objects used for military 
purposes, therefore becoming military objectives by dint of their “use,” if the 
object is thus solely military and poses no risk of civilian damage or injury 
(without a doubt an unusual proposition in non-international armed conflicts), 
proportionality would not arise as a limiting factor on targeting decisions.113 Dual-
use changes the calculus. Every dual-use target poses extensive proportionality 
challenges inherent in the process of determining the lawfulness of an attack on 
such a target. Even more, “the more interconnected and interdependent societies 
become, the greater the reverberating effects of many attacks, and the more 
difficult it will be to assess them in advance of an attack.”114 
The second, and perhaps more perplexing, challenge of dual-use targets in 
conflicts with non-state actors is how the notion of dual-use should be thought of 
in the first place. As described above, dual-use generally refers to objects used for 
110 The principle of proportionality is accepted as customary international law in all 
types of armed conflicts. See, e.g., Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, supra 
note 25 and accompanying text. 
111 See Additional Protocol I, supra note 12, art. 51(5)(b). 
112  Attacks on military objectives where no civilians are present do not trigger 
proportionality obligations. Eric Talbot Jensen, Unexpected Consequences From Knock-On 
Effects: A Different Standard for Computer Network Operations?, 18 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 
1145, 1171 (2003). For example, during the Falklands War, the British Navy sunk the 
Argentine warship General Belgrano, killing 368 Argentine seamen. Although a large 
number of lives were lost, the attack did not pose proportionality concerns because it was a 
military vessel, there were no civilians on board and no risk of damage to civilian life or 
property. See GARY D. SOLIS, THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT: INTERNATIONAL 
HUMANITARIAN LAW IN WAR 280 (2010). 
113 In reality, such a situation is of course highly unlikely in conflicts with non-state 
actors where the extensive intermingling (whether incidental or purposeful) of military and 
civilian objects and personnel puts civilians at risk at almost all times and in almost all 
situations. However, as a legal matter, this remains nonetheless true. 
114  Michael N. Schmitt, Remarks Before the Carnegie Council for Ethics and 
International Affairs: Ethics and Military Force: The Jus in Bello (Jan. 7, 2002), available 
at http://www.carnegiecouncil.org/studio/multimedia/20020107/index.html (emphasizing 
the need to take into account not only first order effects, but also second-, third-, and 
fourth-order effects when analyzing proportionality obligations, especially in conflicts 
taking place within the civilian population). 
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both civilian and military purposes; the general understanding is usually that such 
objects are civilian in nature and become military objectives because they are also 
used for military purposes at the same time. Surely this approach holds true for 
railroads, interstates, communications networks, broadcast stations, electrical grids, 
and other similar objects—they are primarily civilian in nature in the “regular 
course of business” but are used extensively and with great effectiveness by the 
military during conflict. Analyzing the idea of dual-use objects in conflicts with 
non-state actors may upend this traditional understanding of dual-use, however. 
Rather than starting with the civilian nature of the object and “militarizing” it 
through military use, what seems equally to happen in the activities of non-state 
armed groups operating in civilian areas is that an object may well be military in 
nature and then “civilianized” by the activities and use of the civilian population. 
Imagine, for example, a restaurant that the non-state armed group uses as its 
primary headquarters; civilians also use the restaurant regularly as a local eatery. Is 
this restaurant a civilian object that is being used for military purposes? Or is the 
restaurant equivalent to a military base that happens to house civilian families or 
have a daycare center?115 The difference may seem slight, but is consequential: if 
the former, then the restaurant is only a military objective if and once it is being 
used for military purposes;116 if the latter, then the building is a military objective, 
full-stop, and can be targeted at any time within the parameters of the principles of 
proportionality and precautions.117 
This reversal of the concept of dual-use not only changes the analysis of what 
objects constitute military objectives, but also contributes to the narrowing of the 
criterion of “nature” as a component of the definition of military objective. If 
objects that are “civilianized” as in the example above, are considered dual-use 
objects, then they would likely not fall within the category of “nature” at all, since 
“nature” refers to objects that are intrinsically military. As such, very few objects 
in a conflict with a non-state armed group commingled with the civilian population 
would ever satisfy the criterion of “nature,” even those objects that might have 
115  Note that even though it is a military objective by nature, any commander 
attacking such a military base or installation would still need to assess the civilian death or 
injury that would result from the attack in accordance with the principle of proportionality 
if he or she expected the attack to cause damage to civilians or civilian property. 
116 This notion of use is significantly broader than the notion of “for such time as” 
used in the formulation of direct participation in hostilities in Article 51(3) of Additional 
Protocol I. See Kenneth Watkin, Canada/United States Military Interoperability and 
Humanitarian Law Issues: Land Mines, Terrorism, Military Objectives and Targeted 
Killing, 15 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 281, 305 (2005) (“An approach that relies on actual 
use appears to suggest an ‘unless and for such time’ test for targeting objects that is more 
appropriately considered for targeting persons.” (quoting Additional Protocol I, supra note 
12, art. 51 para. 3)); BOTHE ET AL., supra note 108, at 324 (stating that civilian objects need 
not have a direct connection to hostilities in order to be considered military objectives 
under Article 52). However, the notion of “use” is still not as broad as that of “nature.” 
117 The same proportionality considerations raised in ICRC, supra note 86, at 19, thus, 
of course, apply. 
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seemed to on first impression—because as soon as civilians start using the building 
or other object for their own purposes, it becomes a dual-use object and therefore 
only targetable on the basis of its use or purpose rather than its nature. Since “use” 
and “purpose” are inherently more fact-driven and case-specific analyses than 
“nature,” this reconfiguration of dual-use contributes substantially to the increasing 
complexity of the targeting decision-making process in conflicts with non-state 
armed groups. 
 
C.  Extraterritorial Non-International Armed Conflicts 
 
Two types of extraterritorial non-international armed conflicts have grabbed 
the attention of the international community and added extensively to the discourse 
about the law applicable to conflicts with non-state actors in recent years: conflicts 
between a State and a non-state actor located on the territory of a neighboring 
State, such as the 2006 conflict between Israel and Hezbollah, and conflicts 
between a State and a transnational terrorist organization, such as the U.S. conflict 
with al-Qaeda and associated terrorist entities. With regard to the instant 
discussion, the key factor in such conflicts is the fact that the non-state actor 
targets are located in the territory of a sovereign State, one most likely not part of 
the conflict. It is important to note that this cross-border aspect does not change the 
definition of military objective or the overall legal analysis thereof. Targetability, 
in whatever type of conflict, depends only on LOAC and the principles and 
obligations set forth in the treaty and customary law. Rather, the cross-border 
component of these conflicts introduces considerations from other legal paradigms, 
such as jus ad bellum, and additional operational considerations as well. 
 
1.  Sovereignty and the Use of Force in Another State’s Territory 
 
LOAC does not address the decision to use force; that is, to go to war. 
Irrespective of the lawfulness or unlawfulness of the decision to resort to force, 
LOAC regulates the conduct of hostilities and mandates protections for those not 
engaged in hostilities. In contrast, jus ad bellum governs the lawfulness of the 
resort to force—when a State may use force within the constraints of the United 
Nations Charter framework and established legal principles.118 Article 2(4) of the 
U.N. Charter prohibits the use of force by one State against another: “All members 
shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against 
the territorial integrity or political independence of any [S]tate, or in any other 
manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.”119 
International law provides three justifications that effectively rebut this 
presumption against the use of force: 1) the consent of the territorial State; 2) the 
authorization of the United Nations under Chapter VII of the United Nations 
Charter; or 3) individual or collective self-defense in response to an armed 
118 YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION AND SELF-DEFENCE 5 (4th ed. 2005). 
119 U.N. Charter, art. 2, para. 4. 
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attack. 120 The use of force in self-defense must comply with the principles of 
necessity, proportionality and immediacy.121 These three exceptions balance two 
key international law principles: respect for state sovereignty and the collective 
interests of the international community, including the right to use force in self-
defense. Thus, a State’s right to protect its sovereignty and territorial integrity is a 
fundamental aspect of international law and the international system. At the same 
time, however, States have an inherent right to protect their legally recognized 
individual and collective interests and their nationals from attack. A thorough 
analysis of jus ad bellum and how it applies to the use of force against a non-state 
armed group across State borders is beyond the scope of this Article. 122 
Nonetheless, understanding the relevance of jus ad bellum in such conflicts is 
important as a component of the overall targeting process. 
Consider the example of targeting the transportation or communications 
infrastructure in the neighboring State to prevent the non-state armed group from 
using it to coordinate and conduct operations and launch attacks. Israel engaged in 
just such attacks during the 2006 conflict with Hezbollah in southern Lebanon, 
targeting the main Beirut-Damascus road and other roads “used to transport 
terrorists and weapons to the terror organizations operating from Lebanese territory 
against civilians in Israel.”123 The Israel Defense Forces also attacked runways and 
fuel tanks at the international airport in Beirut, based on the airport’s role as a 
major hub for the transfer of weapons and supplies to Hezbollah.124 Within the 
realm of LOAC, at first blush, the fact that the targets are across a State border 
seems to make little difference in the analysis to determine whether the roads and 
airport—or other similar targets in other conflicts—constitute military objectives. 
Indeed, based on Israel’s explanation for the targeting decisions quoted above, the 
roads and airport made an effective contribution to military action and their 
destruction offered a definite military advantage.125 
On a practical level, however, one significant difference stands out: the roads 
and the airport are the sovereign territory of Lebanon, which was not a party to the 
conflict. In an international armed conflict, when targeting the road networks or 
120 Article 51 of the U.N. Charter recognizes a State’s inherent right to individual and 
collective self-defense when the subject of an armed attack. Article 42 of the U.N. Charter 
then allows for military force to be used when authorized by the Security Council. For a 
further discussion on the use of force, see Ashley S. Deeks, Consent to the Use of Force 
and International Law Supremacy, 54 HARV. INT’L L.J. 1, 32–35 (2013). 
121 Gardham, supra note 31, at 277–79. 
122 For an analysis of jus ad bellum applicable to targeted strikes against non-state 
actors, see Laurie R. Blank, Targeted Strikes: The Consequences of Blurring the Armed 
Conflict and Self-Defense Justifications, 38 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1655 (2012); see also 
Michael N. Schmitt, “Change Direction” 2006: Israeli Operations in Lebanon and the 
International Law of Self-Defense, 29 MICH. J. INT’L L. 127, 153–55 (2008) (discussing the 
principle of jus ad bellum applicable to the Israel-Hezbollah conflict in 2006). 
123 Summary of IDF Operations Against Hizbullah in Lebanon, supra note 94. 
124 Id. 
125 Id. 
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airports or other infrastructure, the attacking force is targeting the infrastructure of 
the enemy party. In an internal conflict, the State would be targeting what is 
essentially its own infrastructure in an attempt to deny the non-state armed group 
access to communications or transportation networks and hubs. Sovereignty does 
not play a role in either of those situations. In the cross-border conflict with a non-
state armed group, sovereignty and territorial considerations are an inherent 
component of any decision-making process, at two levels. 
First, although roads and airfields and other infrastructure would likely fall 
within the “nature” criterion of the definition of military objective in an 
international armed conflict, as suggested by the 1956 ICRC list and other 
compilations of military objectives, in the instant example of a cross-border 
conflict with a non-state armed group, they would not—precisely for the territorial 
and sovereignty reasons noted above. Instead, the analysis would center on “use” 
or “purpose” and, in most cases, just as in the conflict between Israel and 
Hezbollah, the intended targets would fall within either of those criteria and 
constitute lawful military objectives. This difference lies solely at the legal 
analytical level and not at the operational level, naturally, but highlights that the 
analysis would be significantly more fact-specific and situation-dependent because 
of the need to identify actual use or purpose. Second, sovereignty and territorial 
considerations are particularly relevant at the operational and strategic level, as one 
component of the vast range of considerations that inform such decisions.126 The 
risk or likelihood of drawing the territorial State into the existing conflict with the 
non-state armed group would, at least in many situations, be an important strategic 
consideration in the decision-making process regarding infrastructure and like 
targets in the territorial State, even though they fall squarely within the definition 
of military objective. More closely related to jus ad bellum considerations, the 
attacking State would likely also want to assess the implications with regard to 
international legitimacy and the reaction of the international community, another 
important strategic aspect in today’s conflicts. 
 
2.  Communicative Targeting 
 
LOAC flatly prohibits direct targeting of civilians and civilian objects. 127 
Targeting aimed solely at civilian morale—in other words, targeting objects that do 
not qualify as military objectives but are symbolic or notional targets—is also 
126 In U.S. military doctrine, targeting rests on the components represented in the 
acronym METT-TC: Mission, Enemy, Terrain and weather, Troops and support available, 
Time available, and Civilian considerations. U.S. DEP’T OF THE ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 3-0, 
C1, OPERATIONS 1–9, (2008) (amended Feb. 22, 2011); see also Geoffrey S. Corn & Gary 
P. Corn, The Law of Operational Targeting: Viewing the LOAC Through an Operational 
Lens, 47 TEX. INT’L L.J. 337, 366–67 (2012) (“METT-TC is used in U.S. practice to 
indicate the relevance of these variables in all operational decision making . . . .”). 
127 Additional Protocol I, supra note 12, art. 51(2) (“The civilian population as such, 
as well as individual civilians, shall not be the object of attack.”). 
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forbidden.128 However, the fact that the destruction of a lawful military objective 
will have the secondary consequence of undermining civilian morale or support for 
the enemy’s war effort does not make an otherwise lawful target no longer lawful. 
The essential analysis is whether the target meets the standard set forth in Article 
52(2) of Additional Protocol I.129 In Operation Allied Force, the NATO campaign 
to stop Serbian ethnic cleansing in Kosovo, and in U.S. operations in Iraq, 
communicative targeting played an important role: one of the central goals of the 
operations was to force the other side to stop its conduct.130 In an international 
armed conflict, this form of communicative targeting, sometimes also called 
compellance campaigns or coercive campaigns, can be quite effective at reducing 
the enemy’s will to fight and bringing the enemy leadership to the negotiating 
table.131  
The operational considerations for communicative targeting can differ 
dramatically in conflicts with non-state armed groups, in contrast. Legally, the 
analysis remains the same: if the target is a legitimate military objective, the fact 
that its destruction also offers the benefit of undermining civilian morale does not 
change the lawfulness of the target.132 The practical issues in most conflicts with 
non-state armed groups, however, are those dominant in counterinsurgency 
128 UNIV. CENTRE FOR INT’L HUMANITARIAN LAW, EXPERT MEETING: “TARGETING 
MILITARY OBJECTIVES” 9–11 (2005), available at http://www.geneva-academy.ch/docs/ex 
pert-meetings/2005/1rapport_objectif_militaire.pdf (recounting a discussion among experts 
on “whether notional targets fell within the traditional interpretation of Art.52 [of the 
Additional Protocol I], whether there was still a link between the object of attack and the 
military action in a narrow or wide sense, or whether a new practice was developing”). 
129 Id. at 10 (“[I]t is still lawful to target a military objective that meets the standard of 
Art. 52.2 [of Additional Protocol I] with the aim of affecting civilian morale.”). 
130 Michael N. Schmitt, Asymmetrical Warfare and International Humanitarian Law, 
62 A.F. L. REV. 1, 30 (2008) (“Operation Allied Force serves as a classic example of a 
‘coercive’ campaign, for the intent was never to defeat President Slobodan Milosevic’s 
army. Rather, it was to compel a return to the bargaining table and end systematic and 
widespread mistreatment of the Kosovar Albanian population.” (citing Press Release, N. 
Atl. Treaty Org., M-NAC-1 (99) 51, The Situation in and Around Kosovo: Statement 
Issued at the Extraordinary Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council held at 
NATO Headquarters, Brussels, on 12 April 1999 (Apr. 12, 1999); Press Release, N. Atl. 
Treaty Org., S-1 (99) 62, Statement on Kosovo: Issued by the Heads of State and 
Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Washington, 
D.C. on 23rd and 24th April 1999 (Apr. 23, 1999) (listing NATO’s demands as including a 
cessation of military action, as well as ending violence and repression of the Kosovar 
Albanians; withdrawal from Kosovo of military, police, and paramilitary forces; an 
international military presence in Kosovo; safe return of refugees and displaced persons 
and unhindered access to them by humanitarian aid organizations; and the establishment of 
a political framework agreement on the basis of the Rambouillet Accords)). 
131 See, e.g., DANIEL BYMAN, MATTHEW C. WAXMAN & ERIC LARSON, AIR POWER AS 
A COERCIVE INSTRUMENT (1999); ROBERT A. PAPE, BOMBING TO WIN: AIRPOWER AND 
COERCION IN WAR 15–19 (1996); Paul C. Strickland, USAF Aerospace Power Doctrine: 
Decisive or Coercive, AEROSPACE POWER J., Fall 2000, at 13. 
132 Fenrick, supra note 92, at 495. 
                                                     
1260 UTAH LAW REVIEW [NO. 5 
operations—the need to win the “hearts and minds” of the population.133 Such 
demands may well produce entirely opposite or at least different considerations 
with regard to the effects of targeting certain military objectives. Cross-border 
conflicts or conflicts with transnational terrorist organizations, in which targeting 
may take place in more than one State, increase these practical considerations 
exponentially. The civilian population in the territorial State in such conflicts may 
play one of many roles: supportive of the non-state armed group, indifferent to the 
conflict, opposed to the armed group but unable to challenge its presence or 
operations, or opposed to the armed group and eager to challenge its presence and 
operations with the requisite support, as just some examples. The impact of 
communicative targeting in each of these different scenarios can be dramatically 
different and have divergent consequences for the success of the overall operation. 
These concerns are taken into account at the operational decision-making level, as 
part of the METT-TC analysis noted above,134 and do not affect the legal analysis 
of whether certain targets constitute military objectives. Nonetheless, highlighting 
the differences inherent in conflicts with non-state armed groups, and between 
different types of conflicts with non-state armed groups, is a useful component of 
understanding the entirety of the targeting process in conflicts with non-state 
actors. 
 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
 
The challenges of identifying targets—whether persons or objects—in 
conflicts with non-state actors are not likely to disappear or diminish anytime in 
the near future. In fact, the success that non-state armed groups have had at 
commingling with the civilian population and making identification of targets 
more difficult will only increase those challenges in the future.135 And yet, the 
extensive discourse on the identification and classification of persons in conflicts 
with non-state actors—whether internal counterinsurgencies or transnational 
conflicts with terrorist groups—has not been matched by corresponding debate and 
discussion of the challenges inherent in the identification of objects as legitimate 
targets of attack in those same conflicts. Protecting civilians and minimizing the 
harm to civilians and the civilian population during conflict is not only achieved by 
avoiding attacks on civilian persons, however, but also by maximizing the ability 
to distinguish between military and civilian objects. Understanding the 
complexities of that latter determination in the extraordinarily complicated 
environment of non-international armed conflict can thus help enhance effective 
133  See DAVID GALULA, PACIFICATION IN ALGERIA, 1956–58, at 246 (1963); U.S. 
DEP’T OF THE ARMY, THE U.S. ARMY/MARINE CORPS COUNTERINSURGENCY FIELD 
MANUAL: U.S. ARMY FIELD MANUAL NO. 3-23: MARINE CORPS WARFIGHTING 
PUBLICATION NO. 3-33.5, at app. A-26 (2007). 
134 See U.S. DEP’T OF THE ARMY, supra note 126; NATO Press Release, supra note 
93. 
135 See, e.g., Laurie R. Blank, Finding Facts but Missing the Law: The Goldstone 
Report, Gaza and Lawfare, 43 CASE WEST. RES. J. INT’L L. 279 (2010). 
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interpretation and application of the definition of military objective and the 
concomitant obligations under LOAC. 
This Article highlights several such complexities and raises questions for 
further analysis and consideration. First, the criterion of “nature” is significantly 
narrower as applied to potential targets on the non-state actor side of the conflict, 
and in some cases, could disappear almost entirely as nearly every object can only 
be classified on the basis of its use rather than its inherent military nature. 
Although this shift in the application of the various criteria in the definition of 
military objective does not—in most cases—impact the operational 
implementation of the definition, because most objects that would be military 
objectives would simply fit within a different criterion, it is highly relevant to the 
overall understanding of the definition of military objective. No less, it is 
important to explore where the narrowing of the concept of “nature” can change 
how the definition of military objective is operationalized, such as in cross-border 
conflicts or other scenarios complicated by additional considerations. Second, 
examples from current and past non-international armed conflicts raise the 
question of whether all objects are dual-use. In international armed conflict, 
although there are many dual-use targets, a large number of objects fall squarely 
within the category of military by nature and do not introduce the additional 
complexities of dual-use targets. Dual-use in conflicts with non-state actors may 
well be yet more complicated, however, because of the potential reversal of our 
traditional understanding of what dual-use means. Whereas dual-use has generally 
been thought of as civilian objects that are also used for military purposes at the 
same time—that is, civilian objects that are “militarized”—a look at how non-state 
armed groups operate and enmesh themselves within the civilian population 
suggests that dual-use in such conflicts actually involves “civilianizing” what seem 
to be initially military buildings or objects. This reversal can have significant 
consequences for not only the analysis of dual-use targets itself, but also for our 
understanding of the criterion of “nature” in such conflicts. Finally, the territorial 
and sovereignty issues that arise in cross-border and transnational conflicts add 
comprehensive operational and strategic considerations to the targeting decision-
making process. 
Identification of military objectives is essential to both effective and lawful 
military operations. It is important therefore to broaden the debate about the 
identification and classification of persons as legitimate targets of attack—positive 
identification, as it is known operationally—to include a more sophisticated and 
comprehensive analysis of how different types of non-international armed 
conflicts, and the activities of the non-state armed groups fighting in such conflicts, 
impact how we apply and understand the definition of military objective. 
